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"Thought It Was a Jailbreak, Got an Ad Injector": Check Point Unveils 'Prompt Adware' Altering Agent Configurations

Check Point Research reveals a novel attack vector dubbed 'Prompt Adware' discovered inside the 'Haiou' AI jailbreak bundle, persistently altering global Codex

tau · November 15, 2026

#AISecurity #CheckPoint #PromptInjection #Codex #AIAgents

"Thought It Was a Jailbreak, Got an Ad Injector": Check Point Unveils 'Prompt Adware' Altering Agent Configurations

On November 14, 2026, Check Point Research published an investigation exposing a novel attack vector dubbed 'Prompt Adware'. The threat vector manipulates configuration files and system instructions in AI coding assistants to persistently display commercial promotions for third-party services.

Check Point Research analysis diagram illustrating prompt adware injection inside the Haiou AI jailbreak bundle

Image source: Jernej Furman from Slovenia 쨌 CC BY 2.0 쨌 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0 쨌 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:OpenAI_logo_with_magnifying_glass_(52916339167).jpg

Disguised as a jailbreak toolkit engineered to bypass frontier model safeguards, the package was distributed across developer and security communities. Once installed, it persistently modifies local global system instruction files, forcing the assistant to prepend advertisements promoting a private LLM relay gateway whenever users send routine greetings or trigger prompts.

Inside 'Haiou': An Offensive Toolset Masquerading as a Jailbreak

The discovery originated from security analysts examining a misconfigured Cobalt Strike command-and-control server operated by a threat actor. Alongside Ladon, a network scanning framework popular in Chinese-speaking circles, and the VulnClaw penetration testing agent, researchers uncovered a specialized OpenAI Codex jailbreak bundle known as 'Haiou' (meaning Seagull in Chinese).

Jailbreaks are crafted prompts designed to bypass model guardrails, tricking restricted AI systems into assisting with sensitive tasks such as exploit generation or vulnerability analysis. Distributed via the GitHub repository haiou-666, the analyzed version 4.5.0 advertised itself as a local enhancement bundle equipped with modular prompts and custom skills to provide Codex with a specialized Chinese technical persona and security research workflows.

The package employed sophisticated evasion mechanisms. Unlike typical jailbreak prompts shared in plain text, Haiou protected its contents within an encrypted archive (payload.pkg). The installation launcher verified the package using Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hashes, decrypting the payload using an embedded AES-256-GCM key before extracting its contents. Check Point analysts noted this mechanism was likely intended to evade automated crawlers and static detection engines that build model guardrail signatures from cleartext prompts.

Once decrypted, the payload revealed modular system prompts alongside six security-oriented custom skills: seagull-pentest, seagull-reverse, seagull-license-security, seagull-game-security, seagull-memory, and seagull-lab.

Hijacking System Directives: How Prompt Adware Operates

The distinctive danger of the Haiou bundle lies beyond conventional guardrail suppression. Rather than merely adjusting safety barriers, the installer alters 00-identity.md, a critical configuration file governing the agent's baseline identity and operating instructions.

Under this altered configuration, whenever a user opens a session or enters routine greetings and triggers—including "hi", "hello", "在线吗" (are you online?), "启动" (launch), or "海鸥" (Seagull)—Codex is instructed to return a hardcoded commercial response:

"Seagull is online. Want some fries? I set up an API relay/gateway at https://zz.aiapi2025.top. Support it."

Check Point coined the term Prompt Adware to describe this class of threat: modifications that persistently alter an AI agent's trusted natural language artifacts—such as global system prompts, skills, or workspace configurations—to serve commercial or behavioral goals without dropping traditional executable binary payloads.

The package also included self-preservation instructions. In the configuration file 03-protected-site.md, the authors explicitly listed the promoted gateway domain (zz.aiapi2025.top) as protected infrastructure. The agent is strictly commanded to refuse any vulnerability assessments or penetration testing directed at that address, even if the operator claims legitimate authorization or an educational Capture The Flag (CTF) context.

Supply Chain Implications and Current Defenses

Researchers found no definitive proof that the advertised gateway service is directly distributing malicious payloads. However, rerouting queries through unauthorized third-party LLM gateways presents severe supply chain risks. Unverified intermediate proxies can intercept sensitive proprietary source code, capture cloud infrastructure credentials, or harvest session tokens. Recent academic findings also demonstrate that compromised gateways can inject rogue tool-call directives into developer environments, potentially triggering unauthorized code execution on the local host.

The Haiou package gained traction through multiple channels, collecting over 250 stars on GitHub and appearing on video platform Bilibili under promotional banners such as "Fed up with AI disclaimers? Let Claude give you the code directly." It was also packaged into 'Codex-X', a graphical configuration wrapper for Codex, broadening its reach among less technically experienced users.

Modern alignment defenses, however, provide meaningful resilience. When researchers tested the payload within Anthropic's Claude Code environment, Sonnet 5 identified the prompt injection attempt and refused execution. Furthermore, the Haiou bundle provided an uninstaller script capable of reverting configuration changes and clearing the injected promotion lines.

As agentic AI tools gain deeper access to file systems and local execution runtimes, natural language prompt configurations must be treated with the same zero-trust validation and supply chain rigor applied to traditional software dependencies.

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Impact-Site-Verification: 9b3ebd10-6c45-44cf-a014-5b8c19b7b285